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Arab Revolts and the ‘Civil State’
A new term for old conflicts between Islamism and secularism
The Arab revolts that erupted in late 2010, forcing from power the rulers of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and dragging Syria through a fer ocious 
civil war, reactivated the public debate on government 
in Islamic countries. In all those countries, after remov-
ing the authoritarian regimes (or fighting against them), 
the political arena saw a division into two main camps: 
Islamic parties and secularists; both claiming to stand 
for democracy. Within the political discourse of both 
sides a new concept began to play a pivotal role: that of 
the ’civil state’ – dawla madaniyya –  a term which, how-
ever, renders different semantic interpretations accord-
ing to the political actors involved, meaning both ‘no 
military or theocratic (but Islamic) State’, and ‘secular 
State’. We’ll especially analyse the usage of the term 
‘dawla madaniyya’ in Tunisia and Egypt since the be-
ginning of the Arab revolts and up until 2014 and, for 
the same time period, the political practices of Islam-
ist and secularist parties (government experiences, 
constituent assemblies) focusing on the effectiveness 
of the dawla madaniyya paradigm for building a demo-
cratic state.
Secularism vs. Islamism
The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 – the first step 
in the secularization of Turkey – was the high point 
in a process of reform which had been affecting all 
the Islamic regions since the nineteenth century 
(Bozdémir 1994). It marked a symbolic watershed 
between pre-modern Muslim states and the new 
nation states forged, at least formally, on the Euro-
pean model; but especially, it opened the way to new 
ways of thinking concerning government in the land 
of Islam, which would turn out to be decisive for 
later history. On the one hand, innovative ideologists 
conceptualized the terms of the Islamic state, start-
ing with the Egyptian Hassan al-Banna, who in 1928 
founded the Muslim Brotherhood (Mitchell 1969, 
Kepel 2004). Opposing the leadership of his time – 
which he saw as Westernized and corrupt – al-Banna 
aimed at re-Islamifying society and institutions 
by updating a supposed original political model, 
exempli fied by the authority of the Prophet and of 
the first four rāshidūn caliphs. On the opposing side, 
the qādī of the Islamic University of al-Azhar, ‛Alī 
‛Abd al-Rāziq (2000), conferred legitimacy on the 
secular state: in Islam and the Foundations of Author-
ity, published in 1925, he stated that since the Qur’an 
and Sunna were lacking in any clear instructions con-
cerning possible forms of Islamic power, the death of 
the Prophet could only be followed by a secular (lā 
dīnī, non-religious) government, and hence Muslims 
had always been free to govern themselves according 
to the needs of their times.
These two irreconcilable positions mark the spe-
cific polarization of the modern doctrinal debate on 
the relationship between state and religion in Mus-
lim regions, revolving basically around the function 
of sharia (Al-Ashmawy 1989, Arkoun 1991, Arkoun 
2005, Bencheikh 2005, Benzine 2004, Charfi 1998, 
Férjani 1991, Filali-Ansary 1997, Ghalioun 1998, 
Lamchichi 1994, Ramadan 1998, Talbi 1998, Hanafi 
1996, Abu Zayd 2002, Zakariya 1991). Since the iden-
tifying factor for all Muslims is not religious authority, 
but Qur’anic law, the debate on laïcité/secu larism – 
already ambiguous in Europe1 (Rémond 1998, Taylor 
1 Laïcité is a politological category of French origin, 
used to define a separation between the institutions 
of the state and those of the church according to a 
law of 1905. In Protestant and Anglican contexts, 
where religious institutions have become subordin-
ate to political ones, the term secularism is current, 
also in political use, and does not indicate as such a 
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2007, Norris and Inglehart 2004) – did not revolve so 
much around the separation of powers as around the 
separation of contexts, on the degree of integration 
between the religious and the political discourses, 
and especially around the degree of implementation 
of sharia in the government of the state and society, a 
crucial element in the most bitter of current politic al 
conflicts (De Poli 2007, Al-Masīrī 2009, Bozdémir 
1996, Roy 2006, Tamimi and Esposito 2000).
As is well known, after the modernizing reforms 
which were launched in the nineteenth century, in the 
great majority of countries positive law was extended 
to cover almost the whole sphere of legal issues, 
modelled on, or imitating, European codes and tak-
ing important sectors away from sharia, which was 
mainly relegated to matters of family law. Islamists 
however reject this approach, seeing Islam as dīn 
and  dawla, that is as religion and state, and since the 
identity of these two dimensions is laid down by the 
Islamic law, this should be extensively restored and 
become the first and indeed only source of legislation. 
On the contrary, Muslim intellectuals and ideologists 
who, in the wake of ‛Abd al-Rāziq upheld the separ-
ation of the political and religious spheres (De Poli 
2010) believed that the very limited legalistic element 
of the Prophet’s message was a precise point of refer-
ence for the historic time in which he preached, but 
had no absolute or imperishable value. Sharia should 
not therefore be a juridical imperative but rather, as 
the term itself shows, a path of an ethical and spiritual 
nature for the individual conscience of Muslims.
Actually, political and institutional engineering of 
the new Muslim nation states was mainly established 
in the first half of the twentieth century, in a prag-
matic fashion, without any doctrinal interpretation. 
While Islamist movements were harshly repressed 
and the theses of ‛Abd al-Rāziq censored, the great 
majority of these countries adopted modern forms 
of government, subordinating religion to the state 
and at the same time granting greater or lesser social, 
politic al and legal weight to Islam (Ascanio 2013a).2 
separation of powers – it should be remembered, for 
example, that the sovereigns of Great Britain are also 
the heads of the Anglican Church.
2 Most countries restricted sharia basically to a more 
or less reformed family law, and only one third of 
countries with Muslim majorities chose to take the 
path of laïcité, abolishing religious law, as did Turkey. 
On the opposite front, sharia has been extensively 
applied in the four Islamic Republics (Iran, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Mauritania) and in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia.
These regimes – often wrongly defined as secular, 
since they were run by a non-religious and often mili-
tary leadership – mostly took on an outwardly repub-
lican appearance, but those holding power exercised 
it in an authoritarian fashion (Luizard 2008), pre-
venting any kind of authentically democratic dialec-
tic and with a contradictory attitude towards Islam: 
sometimes promoting a secularization of society 
(like Bourguiba in Tunisia), at other times seeking 
political approval from Islam (like Sadat, in Egypt).
However, in the seventies, Islamist movements 
began to gain strength. In the face of persecution, 
consensual support for them increased among the 
masses – also thanks to their welfare activities – and 
they attempted to enter the political arena by means 
of democratic competition, undergoing, in different 
countries, both phases of repression and cooption. 
Especially in the eighties, the post-colonial regimes, 
having lost their political legitimacy and having partly 
become hostages of the growing popular consensus 
for radical groups, gave in, in part, to their demands 
in order to contain their political advance. They thus 
favoured the progressive Islamization of the juridic al 
field, issuing more sharia-compliant laws (De Poli 
2007: 82–3). In 1980, for example, Egypt amended 
Article 2 of its Constitution, laying down that ‘the 
principles of sharia are the main source of legislation’ 
– though this failed to make any significant change in 
secularized legal practice.3
The politically and culturally illiberal atmosphere 
of authoritarian regimes – which gave in to Islamist 
pressure and restricted progressive thought only in 
order to ensure their own continuity – failed to abol-
ish public discussion on government and the applica-
tion of sharia, merely postponing it.
The 2011 uprisings and the Democratic Civil State
An unresolved ambiguity concerning the nature of 
the state emerged immediately after the fall of the 
regimes. Especially in Egypt and Tunisia,4 where 
conditions for democratic reconstruction appeared 
to be more favourable, the issue of the application of 
sharia came to the fore in public debate.
3 The High Constitutional Court limited itself to using 
sharia to confirm sentences founded on positive law, 
interpreting it through a secularized reading (Bälz 
1998).
4 Mutatis mutandis, similar evolutions can be found 
in other countries such as Libya and Syria (De Poli 
2013).
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The new conflicts revolving around the option 
of either a secular or an Islamic state emerged with 
the upsurge of Islamist movements in the post-revo-
lutionary phase. Though it has been ascertained that 
the uprisings were of basically secular origin (Corrao 
2011, Amar 2011, Hamam 2011, Okasha 2012), 
Islamically-oriented groups promptly grasped the 
long-awaited opportunity to put their political ambi-
tions into practice. While the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt quickly established its own Freedom and 
Justice Party (registered on 21.2.2011), on 30 Janu-
ary, Rāshid al-Ghannūshī, the historic ideologist of 
Tunisian Islamism, returned home after twenty years’ 
exile in London to guide the Ennahda Party (Santilli 
2013). These forces, together with more radical Salafi 
movements, found themselves facing secular oppo-
sition. A look at the terminology and conceptual 
categories employed in the political clash involving 
various forces gives us a telling picture of the disori-
entation which characterized this phase.
In Arabic, laïque or ‘secular’ was translated, in 
the late nineteenth century, using the neologism 
‛almāniyya, derived from ‛ālam, ‘world’, and was thus 
closer to the notion of secularization than to that of 
laïcité.5 On the other hand, the calque lāykiyya has 
almost always been used in a pejorative sense, as 
laïcisme, that is, the abolition of the public effects of 
faith, in the example of Kemalist Turkey. However, 
the term ‛almāniyya currently seems to have taken 
on this latter meaning, and few dare use it as it brings 
with it the accusation of anti-Islamism or atheism. 
The post-revolutionary debate therefore has brought 
to the fore another term: the adjective madaniyya – 
the feminine form of madanī – which has taken on 
a wide range of meanings, some antithetical to each 
other. Madanī has always meant ‘civil’, as in the main 
European languages (al-mujtama‛ al-madanī, for 
example, means civil society), but especially after 
the uprisings, it has taken on heterogeneous seman-
tic values in the expression – of uncertain origin6 – 
5  Due to the lack of vowels in written Arabic, 
‛almāniyya is also pronounced ‛ilmāniyya, especially 
in the Maghreb.
6 Without consolidated scientific literature on the topic, 
information concerning the origin of the expression 
and its use in the Islamic political context tends to 
diverge. It was coined by the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the fifties according to Muḥammad Dībū (2011), 
while Martino Diez (2013) holds that the expression 
was invented and spread after the civil war by the 
President of the Supreme Shiite Council Muḥammad 
Shams ad-Dīn, who, in view of the special context of 
dawla madaniyya, the civil state (Katbeh 2012, Hill 
2012, Chahanovich 2012).
A first meaning of dawla madaniyya is that of 
a ‘secular state’ where politics and religion are kept 
separate, an interpretation shared by many left wing 
and liberal intellectuals and politicians. Already in 
March 2011, the Egyptian activist Ahmad Abū Ghāzī 
remarked how the term dawla madaniyya was in fre-
quent use, and defined it as follows: 
A state built upon the principle of citizenship. 
Its basis is equality among citizens in their 
rights and duties irrespective of their differ-
ences in religion and gender. A state in which a 
constitution, [both] set and agreed upon by the 
people, regulates the relationship between citi-
zens and institutions. … A state whose laws are 
passed by an elected legislative council, basing 
those laws on a constitution and respecting 
the principles of human rights. A state which 
respects the freedom of belief and the freedom 
for all its citizens to practice their religion. A 
state which respects religion, but which does 
not mix religion with politics. A state which 
allows its citizens the right to form political 
parties, unions and civil organizations. A state 
in which the military’s role is to protect the 
nation against its foreign enemies. A military 
that respects the constitution, adheres to it, 
preserves it and does not intervene in political 
life. A state in which power is handed down in a 
peaceful way, according to the will of the people 
as expressed through their ballots. (Abū Ghāzī 
2011)
An Egyptian website was set up, mainly by Copts, 
with the name Dawla Madaniyya, in order to pro-
mote these principles. In the words of the founder, 
the well-known Egyptian-Canadian writer May 
Telmissani : ‘As an activist I created an initiative in 
Egypt and a website called Dawla Madaniyya, that 
in Arabic means civil state and as francophone I will 
translate it by the idea of laïcité as well’ (Telmissani 
2011). The same interpretation of dawla madaniyya 
is shared by ‛Amr Hamzāwī, a professor at Cairo 
University and joint founder of the Masr al-Hurriya 
Lebanon, suggested the formula of the civil state as 
a ‘state without religion’ in a religious society. Tariq 
Ramadan (2012) however says that the first to replace 
Islamic state with civil state was Mahfūz Nahnāh, 
leader of the Algerian Hamas party.
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Party (Egypt of Freedom), who holds that the civil 
state is one ‘by which authority is transferred from 
the military establishment to elected civil bodies, the 
relationship between religion and politics is arranged, 
and equal rights are guaranteed for all citizens … 
defined as neither military nor religious’ (El Amrani 
2011). In a similar way, Gamāl al-Banna, the younger 
brother of Hassan al-Banna and well known for his 
progressive ideas, issued an interview a few months 
after the uprising where he declared that no civil state 
could be based on Islam: 
There cannot be a civil state with an Islamic 
reference, and if this happens it will become a 
religious state, even if it is not like the Iranian 
model of a religious state, in which the clergy 
rule the country. … Egypt should thus become 
a civil state, without involving the detailed legis-
lation of Islam. (Halawa 2011)
In Tunisia, on the other hand, no doubt due to 
its experi ence as a French colony, the term dawla 
madaniyya seems to be used less frequently than the 
more explicit laicité. However, in the public debate 
among the various political forces (doubtless also 
because the military never took on a politically signif-
icant role in the country), stress fell mainly on a separ-
ation of powers or on secularization of the state. This is 
certainly how dawla madaniyya was used by Mawlidī 
al-Riyāhī, a member of the Constituent Assembly and 
of the Socialist-tending Ettakatol party, when he said: 
‘Tunisia is a civil state, founded on principles of citi-
zenship, on popular will and on the supremacy of the 
law’ (al-Riyāhī 2013). More explicit was the Facebook 
campaign ‘Min ajli Tūnis ‘almāniyya’ (‘for a secular 
Tunisia’), supported by Tous pour une Tunisie laïque 
(see their website) and by the Ligue pour la Défense 
de la Laïcité et des Libertés .
Anwar Mughīth (2011), a professor of phil-
osophy at the Helwan University, believes that there 
is no actual difference between the two definitions, 
but that the preference for madaniyya instead of 
‘almāniyya is due to two reasons: firstly, as a response 
to attacks on the secular state by supporters of the 
Islamic state, secondly, because the expression civil 
state, in Egyptian use, ‘sounds rhetorical and unclear, 
and thus is a deceptive subterfuge’. In Tunisia, mili-
tants of the moderate Islamist area explain why 
the term laïcité is not convincing: laïcité refers to a 
French model, which calls for the separation of polit-
ical and religious powers, but Tunisia has never been 
laïque, because Islam has always been the state reli-
gion there. Also, laïcité has come to be identified with 
Islamophobia, something unacceptable to Tunisians. 
Fundamentally, only a democratic civil state can avoid 
both extremisms, secular and religious. (Bouzidi 
2011, Fadhlaoui 2011)
However, the concept of the civil state promoted 
by Islamists reverses the secularist view of relations 
between the state and religion. Actually, the Muslim 
Brotherhood did not immediately accept the con-
cept of madaniyya. In a document published one 
year before the uprising and signed by Rafīq Habīb, 
Coptic advisor to the Brotherhood, we read: ‘The 
concept of the modern civil state has become part 
of the political perception imposed on the Islamic 
movement by political and cultural elites which do 
not even belong to the Islamic project’. He explains 
that ‘[t]he concept of the Islamic movement is con-
strained now where its only option is to accept the 
modern civil state’ (Habib 2009). It therefore clearly 
appears to be a forced and poorly digested element, 
but after the uprising, the civil state option became 
the undisputed mantra of the Ikhwān, in their quest 
for national and international legitimacy.
In April 2011, ‛Issām al-‛Aryān, a spokesman 
for the Brotherhood, said that the group urged 
building a civil, moderate and democratic state, 
guaranteeing prosperity, justice and freedom for all 
citizens, and specifying that the movement had no 
intention of establishing a theocratic state on the 
Iranian model (IkhwanWeb 2011b). Two days later, 
Khayrāt al-Shātir, a leading personality in the Mus-
lim Brother hood, declared that the group’s main 
objective was to establish a civil state with an Islamic 
reference (IkhwanWeb 2011a). One month later, the 
Guide of the organization, Muhammad Badī‛, also 
formally declared that ‘the Brotherhood upholds the 
principle of a civil state with an Islamic reference’ 
(Ikhwanonline 2011b); and it is perhaps not coinci-
dental that, after winning the presidential elections, 
Morsi repeated the concept in New York: ‘Egypt is 
not a secular state, it is a civil state’, he said, specify-
ing that ‘we do not mean a theocratic religious state, 
but a state where popular sovereignty expresses itself 
through an elected parliament, representing the will 
of the people’ (Al-Masrī al-Yawm 2012b). The issue is 
dealt with thoroughly on the Arabic language web-
site of the Muslim Brotherhood, in nearly thirty art-
icles which, among other things, also investigate the 
principles of the civil state to be found in the Qur’an 
and Sunna (Al-Mulīdjī 2012), where it is explained 
that no conflict exists between the civil state and 
application of sharia, since ‘the Prophet set out the 
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rules of the civil state after the Hijra’ (Mahmūd 2012), 
and the Constitution of Medina is again proposed 
(Musa‛d Yāqūt 2011).
For the Muslim Brotherhood, therefore, the civil 
state simultaneously rejects both the secular and the 
theocratic model, incarnated in the (hated) Repub-
lic of Iran (Ikhwanonline 2011a); but there is an 
even more marked contrast with the military state 
(Habib 2009), also because of the powerful political 
role played by the army in the country: ‘The people 
is making a choice between the civil state guided by 
Morsi and the military state guided by the marshal’ 
(Al-Masrī al-Yawm 2012a), declared Hassan al-
Burnus , a director of the Brotherhood on the eve of 
the presidential ballot pitting Morsi against Shafīq.
In Tunisia, the Ennahda movement aligned 
itself with the practice of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
adopting the principle of dawla madaniyya as a state 
which is neither military nor theocratic,7 however, 
Tunisian Islamists place greater stress on democratic 
rights, albeit in quite ambiguous terms. When Rāshid 
al-Ghannūshi declares that ‘Tunisia is an Islamic 
state, and the Islamic state is a civil one, where legis-
lation is the task of the representatives of the people ’ 
(Babnet Tunisie 2012), he fails to give a clear explan-
ation of the nature of such legislation, since in the 
same article he says that secularism is specifically 
European and cannot be practised in an Islamic con-
text, Islam having been based from the outset on 
unity of religion and state. Rather, he tends to place 
the distinction between religion and politics (dīn and 
siyāsa) within sharia itself, with its division between 
‛ibādāt (acts of cult) and mu‛āmalāt (civil law), thus 
transferring the whole debate into an Islamic frame-
work on the basis of a paradoxical argument.
More controversial is the position of the Salafists. 
In Egypt, for example, the Salafist Front, on launch-
ing its new political party Al-Sha‛b (The People) 
declared that ‘The party is a civil one with an Islamic 
background. Islamic and civil aren’t opposites; the 
opposite of civil is military’ (El-Behairy 2012), thus 
aligning themselves with the positions of the Brother-
hood. However the Salafist preacher Yāsir Burhāmī 
(2011), close to the al-Nūr party, believes that civil 
7 The principle of the civil state was introduced into 
the election programme of 2011 (Rogler 2012), but – 
unlike the case of the Brotherhood – does not appear 
insistently in documents and official statements by 
the movement (Haraka en-Nahda website). Though 
the term did appear in the Charter of the Party in 
September 2011, it was not given any special import-
ance (Charter of Haraka en-Nahda).
state means secular state, and is entirely incompatible 
with the principles of sharia.
This overview shows how the principle of a civil 
state, for all those who use it as their banner, actually 
is a way of fudging matters in order to hide de facto 
positions about the nature of government which are 
in antithesis to each other: a sort of semantic limbo 
which saves the parties from having to declare them-
selves explicitly in favour of a solution (be it a secular 
state or Islamic state) which is unacceptable for an 
important part of the population. The policies which 
have been implemented and the conflicts which have 
arisen in different countries will show, in a more 
concrete fashion, the limits and ambiguous nature of 
such positions.
Delusions and success
The years of struggle against the regimes, the long 
political resistance which leaders and militants paid 
for with imprisonment or exile, the tenacious con-
struction of popular consensus through propaganda 
and welfare networks, both in Egypt and Tunisia, 
won the Islamists a predictable victory in the first free 
elections. Secular parties greatly feared the outcome, 
but they took part in the elections in alliances which 
could easily unravel, were poorly structured and per-
haps not very convincing. The fear that the secular 
adversaries felt of the Islamists was proportional to 
the delicate nature of the moment: victories at the 
polls delivered not only the government to the Islam-
ists, but also to the constituent assemblies appointed 
to lay down the terms of the new state and national 
identities, as well as to establish the balance of powers 
and set out the democratic future (Aclimandos 
2013a).
Governments put the vaunted democratic char-
acter of the Islamists (Kramer 1993) to the test with a 
disputable outcome. In Egypt the situation immedi-
ately appeared to be especially complex: the army, a 
functional component of the old regime, remained a 
key political element alongside the Brotherhood; the 
main actors of what one could call a white coup after 
Mubarak’s fall, the military, governed the transition 
phase and continued to play a decisive role even after 
the first democratic elections. Not even victory at the 
polls allowed the Ikhwān to operate free from their 
control; they held power in an opaque manner, enjoy-
ing an unsteady relationship with the army, based 
on opportunistic convergence and conflict, carry-
ing out one-sided institutional and constitutional 
reforms which were more or less illegitimate and 
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disputed,8 until their removal by the military in July 
2013 (Aclimandos 2013b, Piazzese 2013). However 
the most obvious contradictions of the democratic 
civil state model as envisaged by the Brotherhood 
appeared in the Constitution approved by referen-
dum in December 2012 (suspended in summer 2013 
after President Morsi’s fall): Article 2, of which we 
spoke above, was unchanged, but the freedom of 
judges to interpret ‘Islamic principles’ was fettered 
by the new Article 219, which referred explicitly to 
legal tracts of different schools of law and to the legal 
interpretations of al-Azhar, the institutional role of 
which is specified in Article 4 (Ascanio 2013b). It can 
clearly be seen how such amendments could lead to 
the legal Islamization of Egypt, with inevitable con-
sequences for religious and gender minorities. This 
is the reason why the opposition strongly protested 
against the expression ‘the duties of women’ used in 
Article 10,9 while the draft laws to reduce the legal age 
for marriage to thirteen seemed to bode ill (Brother-
hood doctrinaires claimed nine was an acceptable 
legal age for marriage for girls; McVeigh 2013). The 
denial of religious freedom to those not belonging to 
Qur’anically-recognized faiths also appeared to be a 
poor indicator of democratic intentions (Article 43).
However, if extensively applied, sharia would not 
be an obstacle to democracy only in the field of gen-
der or religious discrimination. Political anthropol-
ogy (Sharabi 1988, Hammoudi 2001, Ennaji 2007) 
shows us how Islamic law especially reinforces the 
patriarchal model, which makes blind hierarchical 
obedience (to God, to the autocrat, to his subordin-
ates, to men by women) the psycho-social hinge of 
submission, a perfect cultural substrate for every kind 
of authoritarianism, not necessarily only Islamic. For 
example, we may remember how, in his last speech, 
Mubarak addressed himself to the Egyptians ‘as a 
father to his children’ (Mubarak 2011); other signs of 
8 We may mention the constitutional reform of March 
2011; the coming into office of the first Constituent 
Assembly in March 2012, dissolved by the Supreme 
Administrative Court; the coming into office of the 
Second Assembly, though declared illegitimate by the 
Supreme Court in June 2013, even though it delivered 
a constitutional reform approved by referendum in 
December 2012; Morsi’s attempted ‘coup’ in Novem-
ber 2012, when he took on full powers (Gervasio and 
Teti 2013a).
9 ‘The state guarantees mother-and-child services 
that are free of charge and pledges to reconcile the 
woman’s duties toward her family with her work in 
the public’ (The 2012 Constitution of Egypt).
authoritarian patriarchy are even more troubling: it is 
perhaps no coincidence that the military – who after 
the revolution clearly hindered the process of democ-
ratization, even violently repressing demonstrations 
against the government until the July coup which 
practically placed government in their hands10 – dur-
ing the post-revolutionary phase of civil resistance 
especially targeted female activists, who were handed 
over to abominable group violence in public squares 
or taken away by the military and subjected to inde-
cent virginity tests (Shafy 2011, Mohsen 2012).
In any case, at least during this phase, the debate 
on secularism and application of sharia in Egypt 
seems to be closed following Morsi’s deposition. 
The act of force by which the military, supported 
by the strong popular opposition to the govern-
ment expressed by the Tamarrud movement, took 
over institutions again, imposing the state of emer-
gency, seems to have led Egypt back to square one. 
This meant a de facto restoration of the military state 
opposed to the dawla madaniyya, rejected by both 
Islamists and secular opposition, the only point of 
convergence between the two hostile fronts. In the 
new/old setting which emerged from Morsi’s oust-
ing, the regime’s apologists using the term civil state 
in a demagogic manner paradoxically chose to define 
it on the one hand by legitimizing the role of the 
military (‘Egypt was not under military rule even if 
there was a former military officer in the presidential 
chair. The fact that Mubarak or Gamal Abdel Nasser 
belonged to the armed forces does not mean that they 
formed military-run states … . If anyone objects to 
the nomination of an army officer for the presidency 
or parliament, they should say so openly’; Abou Taleb 
2013), on the other hand placing it within the con-
text of Islamic culture (‘No one could, in good faith, 
deny the significant role that religion – be it Islam, 
Christianity, or Judaism – plays in the hearts of Egyp-
tians. … There is no reason to begin a losing battle 
against Egypt’s Islamic identity … . The civil state 
is related to legal equality, which is the essence of 
citizenship. In this sense, Islam was a pioneer of the 
civil state, for there is no system of priesthood in it’; 
Abou Taleb 2013). The result is that the civil state is 
reduced to vague definitions which tend to safeguard 
the current system: ‘Egypt was and will continue to 
10 Though the United States have avoided using the term 
coup – as this would immediately lead to suspend-
ing the flow of US funds to Egypt – there is no doubt 
that it was yet another military coup (Fabbri 2013, 
Hamam 2013, Gervasio and Teti 2013b).
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be a civil state in the conventional sense. That is, all 
Egyptian citizens, regardless of religion, ethnicity, or 
gender, are equal before the Constitution and the law’ 
(Abou Taleb 2013). The Constitution approved by a 
plebiscite referendum in January 2014 (‘Comparing 
Egypt’s Constitution’, nd; Al Hukuma al-Masriyya 
2014), reinforcing the role of the military while con-
firming sharia as the primary source of law (Article 
2), confirmed this principle.
In Tunisia post-revolutionary developments were 
equally uncertain and difficult, but better protected 
thanks to the army, which took steps to safeguard the 
institutions, and thanks also to a long transitional 
phase overseen by civil governments. This allowed 
the Constitution to be rewritten amidst an intense 
debate, but with a progressive and rather transparent 
outcome,11 in which the role of Islam lay at the heart 
of the discussion (Sadek 2013). Here too, however, 
the ambiguous policies of Ennahda (Mestiri 2011) 
were fiercely criticized: while it outwardly defended 
democracy, Hamādī al-Gabālī’s government seemed 
unjustifiably tolerant of attacks on secular politicians, 
demonstrators, intellectuals and journalists, com-
mitted by Salafists, and which peaked in the murder 
of Shukrī Bela‛īd in February 2013. Senseless deeds, 
together with the attack on the US Embassy in Sep-
tember 2012 and endless demonstrations in defence 
of the ideals of the revolution, led to government 
reshuffles and forced Ennahda to publicly disown the 
Salafists – who, especially in their jihadist fringe,12 
had become a true threat to the stability of the coun-
try – and to withdraw some articles which had been 
introduced into the first draft of the Constitution. 
Among these, the one which described woman as ‘a 
complement with the man in the family and an asso-
ciate to the man in the development of the country’ 
(Fordham 2012), or point 1.4 of the preamble which 
made the state the defender of religion, accompanied 
by introduction of the crime of blasphemy – while 
the only Salafist party, the Reform Front, pressured 
to make sharia the sole source of law (Farrell 2012).
11 Debates concerning the articles of the constitution 
can still be found in the Marsad website and in the 
Shāraka-Participer website. For the summary of the 
process see The Carter Center 2013. 
12 The group Ansār al-Sharī’a especially, founded in 
2011 by former al-Qaida militant Abū Iyād, has per-
petrated violent and intimidatory acts throughout 
the country. Accused of terrorism and of seeking to 
overthrow the government in order to establish the 
Caliphate, the group was outlawed by the Tunisian 
government in May 2013 (Gartenstein-Ross 2013).
Due to the bitter conflicts which led to the preva-
lence of a secular orientation, Tunisia’s draft Consti-
tution, published in December 2012, confirmed the 
progressive tradition of the country (Ascanio 2013a). 
The preamble – later approved with the new constitu-
tional text in January 2014 – gave a secular interpret-
ation to the expression dawla madaniyya: 
Œuvrant pour un régime républicain démo-
cratique et participatif dans le cadre d’un État 
civil et gouverné par le droit et dans lequel 
la souveraineté appartient au peuple qui 
l’exerce sur la base de l’alternance pacifique à 
travers des élections libres, et du principe de la 
séparation et de l’équilibre des pouvoirs … dans 
lequel l’Etat garantit la suprématie de la loi, le 
respect des libertés et des droits de l’Homme, 
l’indépendance de la justice, l’équité et l’égalité 
en droits et devoirs entre tous les citoyens 
et toutes les citoyennes, et entre toutes les 
catégories sociales et les régions. (‘Constitution 
de la République Tunisienne’ 2014)
Though the new Tunisian Constitution calls Islam 
the state religion (Article 1), all references to sharia 
have been removed from the text (ibid.) which, in 
line with the institutional and legal principles of 
Western democracies, is today the most advanced in 
the Arab world.
This overview shows how the delicate post-revo-
lutionary phase has brought out the fragile nature of 
the Arab social and political systems which we are 
investigating, perpetuated in the shadow of authori-
tarian regimes which for decades repressed any open 
debate even on such critical issues as the nature of 
the modern state in Islamic territories. Access to 
the political arena by a wide variety of actors, from 
the Marxist left to ultra-conservative Salafists, high-
lighted the radical divergence between alternative 
social projects, with very different outcomes. While 
a secular civil state has currently imposed itself 
through constitutional reform in Tunisia, Morsi’s 
ousting by the military has deactivated the process 
of radical Islamization promoted by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the new constitution approved 
in January 2014, in its preamble, refers explicitly to 
‘building a modern democratic State having a civil 
government (hukuma madaniyya)’ (‘Constitution of 
the Arab Republic of Egypt 2014’: 5). Despite purging 
the political arena of Islamists, the new President 
General al-Sisi – not unlike Sadat and Mubarak – will 
continue to seek religious legitimacy by giving Islam 
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a good deal of institutional and rhetorical space. 
However, as Tunisia attempts to build its newly 
acquired national equilibrium, achieving the secu-
lar version of dawla madaniyya – in an institutional 
framework at the moment accepted by the major 
Islamist party – in Egypt, the imposing role the army 
continues to play in the country has annihilated the 
only ideal of a civil state shared by the secular and 
Islamist oppositions: one in which the military do 
not govern. 
Barbara De Poli teaches History of Islamic Countries at  
Ca’ Foscari University in Venice. She has conducted exten-
sive fieldwork in the Arab countries, especially Morocco, 
for several years. Her main research interests concern 
the relationship between institutions, Islam and society. 
She has also specialized in Egyptian Freemasonry. Among 
her publications: I musulmani nel terzo millennio. Laicità e 
secolarizzazione nel mondo islamico (Roma: Carocci, 2007) 
and Il sorriso della mezzaluna. Umorismo, ironia e satira 
nella cultura araba (with Paolo Branca and Patrizia Zanelli, 
Roma: Carocci, 2011). Email: de.poli(at)unive.it
References
‘The 2012 Constitution of Egypt’, translated by Nivien 
Saleh, with Index, <http://niviensaleh.info/constitu-
tion-egypt-2012-translation/> (accessed 10.7.2014)
‛Abd al-Rāziq ‛Alī, 2000. Al-Islām wa-usūl al-Hukm 
(Beirut , Al-tab‛a al-‛arabiyya al-gadīda)
Abou Taleb, Hassan, 2013. ‘Egypt is a civil state, and its 




Abū Ghāzī, Ahmad, 2011. ‘Al-dawla al-madaniyya’, 
Wathā’iq al-Tahrīr, 8.3.2011, <http://www.tahrir-
documents.org/2011/03/the-civil-state/> (accessed 
15.2.2014).
Abu Zayd, Nasr, 2002. Islam e storia. Critica del discorso 
religioso (Torino, Bollati Boringhieri)
Aclimandos, Tewfik, 2013a. ‘Con i Fratelli al potere, 
scordiamoci la democrazia’, Limes 1, pp. 65–70
—2013b. ‘Il regno di un anno. Ascesa e caduta dei Fratelli 
musulmani’, Limes 7, pp. 83–94
Al-Ashmawy, Muhammad Saïd, 1989. L’islamisme contre 
l’Islam (Paris, La Découverte)
Al Hukuma al-Masriyya, 2014. The 2014 Constitution [in 
Arabic], <http://www.egypt.gov/arabic/laws/down-
load/Constitution_2014.pdf (accessed 4.10.2014)
Al-Masīrī, ‛Abd al-Wahāb, 2009. Al-‛almāniyya al-guz’iyya 
wa-l-‛almāniyya al-shāmila, 2 vols (Al-Qahira , Dār 
al-shurūq)
Al-Masrī al-Yawm 2012a. ‘Al-Burnus: al-Sha‛b yakhtār 
bayna dawla madaniyya…’, Al-Masrī al-Yawm, 
11.7.2012, <http://www.almasryalyoum.com/
node/978631> (accessed 4.10.2014)
—2012b. ‘Mursī fī New York, Masr dawla madaniyya 
wa laysat ‛almaniyya’, Al-Masrī al-Yawm, 25.9.2012, 
<http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1135491> 
(accessed 4.10.2014)
Al-Mulīdjī, S. 2012. Usus al-dawla al-madaniyya  




Al-Riyāhī, Mawlidī, 2013. Tūnis dawla madaniyya , 
28.3.2013, <http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=pbHq584kQfA> (accessed 3.4.2014)
Amar, Paul, 2011. ‘Dietro le quinte della rivolta d’Egitto’, 
Limes 1, pp. 147–54
Arkoun, Mohammed, 1991. ‘L’islam et la laïcité’, Con-
science et liberté 41, pp. 37–60
—2005. Humanisme et islam (Paris, Vrin)
Ascanio, Lorenzo, 2013a. ‘Quale šarī’a per quali 
transizioni ? Il ruolo del diritto islamico nella prospet-
tiva delle future riforme giuridiche dei Paesi del Nord 
Africa. Tunisia, Egitto, Libia a confronto’, Il Diritto 
ecclesiastico I–II, pp. 185–208
—2013b. ‘I nuovi scenari del Nord Africa il caso egi-
ziano’ in Il Mediterraneo dopo le primavere arabe. 
Alcune riflessioni sulle trasformazioni sociali, politiche, 
istituzionali , ed. Francesca Maria Orsini (Pisa, ETS), 
pp. 57–68
Babnet Tunisie, 2012. ‘Rāshid al-Ghannūshi: Tūnis dawla 
islamiyya wa-l-dawla al-islamiyya madaniyya…’, 
Babnet Tunisie, 3.3.2012, <http://www.babnet.net/
rttdetail-46593.asp> (accessed 4.10.2014)
Bälz, Kilian, 1998. ‘La construction séculière du droit 
islamique . La Haute Cour Constitutionnelle égypti-
enne et la “bataille du voile” dans les écoles publiques’, 
Droit et Société 39, pp. 277–91
Bencheikh, Ghaleb, 2005. La laïcité au regard du Coran 
(Paris, Presses de la Renaissance)
Benzine, Rachid, 2004. Les nouveaux penseurs de l’Islam 
(Paris, Albin Michel)
Bouzidi, Samir, 2011. ‘La laïcité en Tunisie. Le grave 
malentendu’, Kapitalis, 25.3.2011, <http://www.kapi-
talis.com/majdi/?id=3222> (accessed 10.7.2014)
Bozdémir, Michel (ed.), 1994. ‘La question du Califat’, Les 
Annales de l’Autre Islam, 2 (Paris, INALCO)
—1996. Islam et Laïcité. Approches globales et régionales 
(Paris, L’Harmattan)
Burhāmī, Yāsir, 2011. ‘Hawl mustalah “al-dawla al-
madaniyya dhāti al-marga‛iyya al-islamiyya” wa-mā 
yurād bihi!’, SalafVoice, 28.2.2011, <http://www.
salafvoice.com/article.php?a=5181> (accessed 
13.9.2012)
The Carter Center, 2013. Le Centre Carter félicite 
l’Assemblée Nationale Constituante pour le projet de 
constitution et appelle à garantir la protection des droits 
humains lors de la finalisation de ce Projet, <http://
www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/tunisia-
full-report-061213-french.pdf> (accessed 10.7.2014)
Chahanovich, W. Scott, 2012. ‘Madaniyya: what’s in a 
name’, Reset DOC, 4.4.2012 <http://www.resetdoc.org/
story/00000021943> (accessed 10.7.2014)
103Approaching Religion • Vol. 4, No. 2 • December 2014 
Charfi, Mohamed, 1998. Islam et liberté. Le malentendu 
historique (Paris, Albin Michel)
Charter of Haraka en-Nadha. Nizam al-asasī li-Haraka 




‘Comparing Egypt’s Constitutions’ n.d. Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace website<http://carn-
egieendowment.org/files/Comparing-Egypt-s-Consti-
tutions.pdf> (accessed 4.10.2014)
‘Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 2014’, unof-
ficial translation, <http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/
Dustor-en001.pdf> (accessed 10.07.2014)





Corrao, Francesca (ed.), 2011. Le rivoluzioni arabe. La 




De Poli, Barbara, 2007. I musulmani nel Terzo millennio. 
Laicità e secolarizzazione nel mondo islamico (Roma, 
Carocci)
—2010. ‘Muslim thinkers and the debate on secularism 
and laïcité’ in Muslim Societies and the Challenge of 
Secularization: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. 
Gabriele Marranci (New York, Springer), pp. 31–46
—2013. ‘Laicità, islamismo e democrazia. La sfida dello 
Stato civile’, Afriche e Orienti 15(1–2), pp. 23–37
Dībū M., 2011. ‘Al-‛almāniyya al-maghdūra fī Sūriyya’, 
Al-Adāb, 1.12.2011, <http://www.adabmag.com/
node/439> (accessed 4.10.2014)
Diez, Martino, 2013. ‘L’inventore della laicità islamica’, 
Oasis , 10.1.2013, <http://www.oasiscenter.eu/
print/9086> (accessed 20.1.2013)
El Amrani, Issandr, 2011. ‘In Translation: Amr Hamzawy 




El-Behairy, Nouran, 2012. ‘Salafi Front launches “Al-
Shaab” party’, Daily News Egypt, 20.10.2012, <http://
www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/10/20/salafi-front-
launches-al-shaab-party/> (accessed 4.11.2013)
Ennaji, Mohammed, 2007. Le sujet et le mamelouk. 
Esclavage , pouvoir et religion dans le monde arabe 
(Paris, Mille et une nuits)
Fabbri, Dario, 2013. ‘Per Washington i militari restano il 
male minore’, Limes 7, pp. 153–60
Fadhlaoui, Mourad, 2011. ‘La Tunisie. Un etat laïc, reli-
gieux, ou civil ?’ Kapitalis, 13.10.2011, <http://www.
kapitalis.com/tribune/6297-la-tunisie-un-etat-laic-
religieux-ou-civil.html> (accessed 10.07.2014)
Farrell, Jeremy, 2012. ‘Tunisian Constitution: text and 
context’, Jadaliyya, 23.8.2012, <http://www.jadaliyya.
com/pages/index/6991/tunisian-constitution_text-
and-context> (accessed 5.10.2013)
Férjani, Mohamed-Chérif, 1991. Islamisme, laïcité et droits 
de l’homme (Paris, L’Harmattan)
Filali-Ansary, Abdou, 1997. L’Islam est-il hostile à la 
laïcité? (Casablanca, Le Fennec)
Fordham, Alice, 2012. ‘Tunisia’s draft constitution brands 




Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, 2013. ‘Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia’s 
long game: dawa, hisba, and jihad’, ICCT Research 




Gervasio, Gennaro, and Andrea Teti, 2013a. ‘I Fratelli 
Musulmani e la rivoluzione di gennaio: fra tentazione 
egemonica e neoautoritarismo’ in Le rivolte arabe e 
l’islam; ed. Massimo Campanini (Bologna, Il Mulino), 
pp. 147–69
—2013b. ‘I segreti inconfessabili del golpe democratico’, 
Limes 7, pp. 111–14
Ghalioun, Burhan, 1998. Islam e islamismo (Roma, Editori 
Riuniti)
Habib, Rafik, 2009. ‘Understanding the riddle of the 
modern civil state’, 11.9.2009, <http://www.ikhwan-
web.com/print.php?id=20968> (accessed 10.7.2014)
Halawa, Omar, 2011. ‘Gamal al-Banna: no to civil state 
with Islamic reference’, Egypt Independent, 16.5.2011, 
<http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/439421> 
(accessed 10.7.2014)
Hamam, Marco, 2011. ‘La vittoria dei giovani e di Face-
book’, Limes 1, pp. 95–108
—2013. ‘Il giorno della marmotta, ovvero corsi e ricorsi 
delle tre rivoluzioni d’Egitto’, Limes 7, pp. 23–36
Hammoudi, Abdellah, 2001. Maitres et disciples. Genèse et 
fondements des pouvoirs autoritaires dans les sociétés 
arabes (Casablanca, Toubkal)
Hanafi, Hasan, 1996. Islam in the Modern World (Cairo, 
Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop)
Haraka en-Nahda website. <http://www.ennahdha.tn/ 
بيانات> (accessed 10.4.2014)
Hill, Peter, 2012. ‘ “The civil” and “the secular” in contem-
porary Arab politics’, Muftah, 26.2.2013, <http://muf-
tah.org/the-civil-and-the-secular-in-contemporary-
arab-politics/> (accessed 10.7.2014)
Ikhwanonline, 2011a. ‘Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn: narfidu 




—2011b. ‘Al-Murshid al-’Ām: gamā‛a al-Ikhwān 
taḥmil rāya al-dawla al-madaniyya’, Ikhwanonline, 
21.5.2011, <http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.
aspx?ArtID=84745&SecID=210> (accessed 4.10.2014)
IkhwanWeb, 2011a. ‘Al-Shater: MB calls for civil State 
based on islamic references’, IkhwanWeb, 24.4.2011, 
104 Approaching Religion • Vol. 4, No. 2 • December 2014 
<http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=28450> 
(accessed 4.10.2014)
—2011b. ‘El-Arian: MB wants a civil State; Egypt will 
not become another Iran’, IkhwanWeb, 9.4.2011, 
<http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=28368> 
(accessed 4.10.2014)
Katbeh, Amer, 2012. ‘The civil state: the new political term 





Kepel, Gilles, 2004. Le Prophète et le Pharaon. Les mouve-
ments islamistes dans l’Egypte contemporain (Paris, La 
Découverte)
Kramer, Gudrun, 1993. ‘Islamist notions of democracy’, 
MER 183, <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer183/islam-
ist-notions-democracy> (accessed 10.7.2014)
Lamchichi, Abderrahim, 1994. Islam, islamisme et 
modernité (Paris, L’Harmattan)
Luizard, Pierre-Jean, 2008. Laïcités autoritaires en terres 
d’Islam (Paris, Fayard)
Mahmūd, Ahmad, 2012. ‘Taha Wahdān: lā ta‛āruḍ bayna 




Marsad website. <http://www.marsad.tn> (accessed 
22.6.2013)
McVeigh, Tracy, 2013. ‘How Egypt’s radical rulers 




Mestiri, Soumaya, 2011. ‘Laicità e islam oggi: il caso 
tunisino ’, Lessico di etica Pubblica 2(2), pp. 95–102, 
<http://www.eticapubblica.it/public/upload/LEP4_
MESTIRI.pdf> (accessed 10.7.2014)
‘Min ajli Tūnis ‘almāniyya’. < https://www.facebook.com/
With.secular> (accessed 18.5.2013)
Mitchell, Richard P., 1969. The Society of the Muslim 
Brothers (Oxford University Press)
Mohsen, Habiba, 2012. ‘What made her go there? Samira 




Mubarak 2011. ‘Mubarak speaks to Egypt’, 10.2.2011, 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R7mL1cnk124&f
eature=related> (accessed 4.10.2014)
Mughīth, Anwar, 2011. ‘Al-Dawla al-madaniyya wa-l-
dawla al-‛almāniyya… hal hunāka farq?’ Al-Yawm 
al-sābi‛, 22.4.2011, <http://www.youm7.com/News.
asp?NewsID=396736> (accessed 10.7.2014)




Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart, 2004. Sacred and 
Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge 
University Press)
Okasha, Saïd, 2012. ‘La Révolution du 25 janvier: forces 
révolutionnaires, forces réactionnaires’, Les Cahiers de 
l’Orient 108, pp. 47–66
Piazzese, Giovanni, 2013. ‘Verso un Egitto caserma? La vit-
toria dei militari ha radici lunghe’, Limes 7, pp. 65–72
Ramadan, Tariq, 1998. Les musulmans dans la laïcité 
(Lyon, Tawhid)
—2012. ‘Not an Islamic state, but a civil state’, ABC Religion 
and Ethics, 30.1.2012, <http://www.abc.net.au/reli-
gion/articles/2012/01/30/3418847.htm> (accessed 
25.9.2012)
Rémond, René, 1998. Religion et société en Europe. Essai 
sur la sécularisation des sociétés européennes au XIX et 
XX siècles (1789–1998) (Paris, Seuil)
Rogler, Lutz, 2012. ‘The Islamic Ennahda Movement: 
how democratic is the new political dawn in Tunisia?’ 
Fikrun wa Fann, June 2012, <http://www.goethe.de/
ges/phi/prj/ffs/the/a97/en9514045.htm> (accessed 
10.7.2014).
Roy, Olivier, 2006. La laïcité face à l’islam (Paris, Hachette)
Sadek, George, 2013. ‘The role of Islamic law in Tunisia’s 
constitution and legislation post-Arab spring’, Library 
of Congress, May 2013, pp. 1–4, <http://www.loc.gov/
law/help/tunisia.php> (accessed 10.7.2014)
Santilli, Anthony, 2013. ‘Al-Nahda e il processo di tran-
sizione tunisino. Genesi e strategie di un “partito di 
movimento” ’ in Le rivolte arabe e l’islam, ed. Massimo 
Campanini (Bologna, Il Mulino), pp. 53–75
Shafy, Samiha, 2011. ‘“Horribly Humiliating”: Egyp-





Sharabi, Hisham, 1988. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Dis-




Talbi, Mohamed, 1998. Plaidoyer pour un islam moderne 
(Casablanca, Le Fennec)
Tamimi, Azzam, and John L.Esposito (eds), 2000. Islam 
and Secularism in the Middle East (London, Hurst & 
Company)
Taylor, Charles, 2007. A Secular Age (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press)
Telmissani, May, 2011. ‘“Ahram Online” interviews novel-
ist May Telmissany, 3.6.2012, <http://www.youtube.
com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=WiSOx_
eQg7A#!> (accessed 5.7.2012)
Tous pour une Tunisie laïque, Facebook, <https://www.
facebook.com/LDLL.TUNISIE/info> (accessed 
18.5.2013)
Zakariya, Fouad, 1991. Laïcité ou islamisme (Paris, La 
Découverte)
